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SUMMARY

GENERAL

1. USSR makes move for diplomatic relations with Japan (page 3).

SOVIET UNION

2. Comment on return of Soviet ambassadors to Moscow (page 3).

SOUTH ASIA

4. Comment on Indian Congress Party's annual meeting (page 5).

EASTERN EUROPE

5. Marshal Rokossovski reportedly visiting East European countries (page 5).

WESTERN EUROPE

6. Italian government's anti-Communist program reported at near standstill (page 6).

LATE ITEMS

7. Pravda editor underscores emphasis on heavy industry (page 7).

8. Comment on Soviet declaration ending state of war with Germany (page 7).

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25X1

26 Jan 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 2

GENERAL

25X1A ¹ .	USSR makes move for diplomatic relations with Japan.
	Moscow has made its first direct mov

Moscow has made its first direct move toward resumption of diplomatic relations with Japan, according to the American embassy in Tokyo. The head of the

Soviet mission—which has no official status in Japan—presented an unsigned and undated document to Prime Minister Hatoyama at his private residence on 25 January, stating that the USSR is prepared to nominate representatives for negotiations to be held either in Moscow or Tokyo aimed at the normalization of relations between the two countries

Comment: The timing of the presentation of this document—on the day after the dissolution of the Japanese Diet—seems to reduce its significance in terms of obtaining immediate resumption of relations between Moscow and Tokyo. Moscow may, however, publicize this approach hoping to ensure that this question remains paramount in the forthcoming election campaign.

The Hatoyama government probably will seek clarification of Moscow's terms and plead that its caretaker status precludes any official commitments prior to the election.

Previously, the Japanese have insisted on some settlement of the questions of war prisoners, fishing rights, and the status of the Habomai and Shikotan Islands before negotiating with the USSR. Tokyo has indicated now, however, that there are no serious impediments to bilateral negotiations. On the other hand, if Moscow should insist on a simultaneous settlement with Peiping, this would be a major obstacle.

SOVIET UNION

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The Soviet ambassadors to France, East Germany, Great Britain, the United States,

26 Jan 55

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 3


Turkey, and Iran have recently returned to Moscow. There are some indications that the ambassadors to North Korea, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia may also be away from their posts. Other ambassadors may also have returned.

It is likely that these ambassadors will be consulted on the prospects for the Paris agreements and the probable reaction to any tougher Soviet line to counter West German rearmament. They may also have been called home at this time for briefing on some new turn in Soviet domestic or foreign policy which would have an important effect on relations with the West. Two of the ambassadors who have returned are members of the party central committee, before which any major policy shifts would probably be presented for approval.

The most pressing problems affecting foreign relations probably are the need to offset prospective West German rearmament with some increase in Orbit military preparedness and the possible need of future increased commitments to Communist China resulting from the Formosa developments.

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26 Jan 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved For Re 25 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001900590001-6



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Rokossovski, a top Soviet World War II marshal, would be a logical choice to act as a front for the Soviet Union in organizing a combined Satellite military establishment.

WESTERN EUROPE

	Con nou: to a	Italian government's new anti- nmunist program which was an- nced last month has slowed almost standstill, according to the American ny attaché in Rome. No date has been
_ Г		tatively scheduled for January to dis-


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Comment: When the Scelba government announced its new anti-Communist drive on 4 December, the premier described it as critical for the future of democratic government in Italy. Officials stated that failure of this program would probably lead to the adoption of totalitarian methods to stop Communism. Little progress has been made thus far in breaking up Communist agricultural and business co-operatives and trading companies or in weeding out Communist government employees. Action on social reforms has also bogged down.

26 Jan 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6

25X1A

LATE ITEMS



to re-emphasize the dual purpose of the 15 January Soviet statement: to dangle before the West Germans the prospect of diplomatic relations and to warn that if the Paris accords are ratified Moscow will strengthen East Germany's position in the Orbit. The USSR has sought to underscore its determination to take new measures in East Germany by advertising recent diplomatic talks with East German officials in Moscow and Berlin.

26 Jan 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7

The Soviet declaration, which comes three years after similar Western declarations, makes it clear that the Soviet Union's "rights and obligations" in Germany under four-power agreements are not affected. Poland and Czechoslovakia are likely to follow the Soviet lead.

Moscow's statement will have little effect in West Germany. The declaration will probably provide a basis for the eventual establishment of East German armed forces and a national airline, and for the transformation of the interzonal border into a national boundary. It might also be used as a substitute for a peace treaty with East Germany, thereby avoiding such problems as those involving Berlin and the Oder-Neisse line.

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26 Jan 55

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN